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MAINE’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY AND THE EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
LAW COURT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO USE
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN
STATE V. LETALIEN
Lauren Wille*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Eric Letalien pleaded guilty to the gross sexual assault of a thirteenyear-old girl, an offense he committed when he was nineteen years old.1 At the
time of his sentencing in August of 1996, Letalien was subject to Maine’s Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1995 (SORNA of 1995).2 Pursuant
to SORNA of 1995, Letalien was required to register his address with the State
Bureau of Identification (SBI) and update his address in the event he moved.3 This
registration requirement was to be in effect for fifteen years from the time he was
released from incarceration.4 After five years, however, Letalien would be eligible
to petition for a waiver from the Superior Court if he could show that the
registration requirement was no longer necessary.5
In 1999, the Maine Legislature passed a more stringent version of the SORNA
law (SORNA of 1999).6 In 2001, the Legislature once again amended SORNA of
1999 so that it applied retroactively to offenses committed on or after June 30,
1992.7 As a result of the 2001 amendment, Letalien was subject to the reporting
requirements of SORNA of 1999.8 Under the amended law, instead of being
required to register as a sex offender for fifteen years, with the possibility of
obtaining a waiver after five years, Letalien was required to register for the rest of
his life without the possibility of ever obtaining a waiver.9 In addition, SORNA of
1999 required him to report in person to his local law enforcement agency every
ninety days in order to verify his address and place of employment, to be

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Melvyn Zarr for his invaluable insight and guidance on this Note. I would also like to thank the editors
and staff of the Maine Law Review for their excellent editing and hard work.
1. State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 2, 985 A.2d 4, 7-8. According to then-Maine law, a person
was guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engaged in a sexual act with another person who had not
in fact attained fourteen years of age. 17-A M.R.S.A., § 253(1)(B) (1992-1993).
2. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 3, 985 A.2d at 8 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11101-11144 (1996-1997)).
3. Id. ¶ 5, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(2)-(3) (1996-1997)).
4. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(2) (1996-1997)).
5. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(6)(C) (1996-1997)).
6. Id. ¶ 6, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18, 1999) (codified at 34-A
M.R.S.A. §§ 11201-11252 (1999-2000))).
7. Id. ¶ 7, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2001, ch. 439, § 000-7 (effective Sept. 21, 2001) (codified at
34-A M.R.S.A. § 11202 (2001-2002))).
8. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 7, 985 A.2d at 10.
9. Id. ¶ 8, 985 A.2d at 10.
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fingerprinted, and to have his photograph taken.10 In 2003, the Legislature once
again amended SORNA of 1999 to require the SBI to maintain an Internet website
posting this information.11
When Letalien was arrested in 2007 for failure to comply with the SORNA of
1999 registration requirements, he challenged SORNA of 1999, asserting that its
retroactive application against him violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the
Maine Constitution and the United States Constitution.12 Letalien argued that the
Maine Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws afforded a greater level of
protection than the minimum standard secured by the Federal Constitution, and that
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, should utilize an
analysis independent of federal courts’ analyses of ex post facto challenges.13 The
Law Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Maine and Federal
Constitutions are coextensive, and evaluated the law consistent with the United
States Supreme Court’s analysis of ex post facto laws, ultimately concluding that
the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 was a violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clauses of both constitutions.14
Justice Silver concurred in the judgment, and argued that Maine’s Constitution
provides a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws than the United
States Constitution.15 His concurrence focused on the location of the Ex Post Facto
Clause in the Declaration of Rights article in the Maine Constitution, as compared
with the location of the clause in the legislative powers article of the Federal
Constitution.16 Justice Silver argued that the respective placement of the clauses
indicated that the Maine Constitution “declares that the right to be free of ex post
facto laws as a personal right, and not simply a limitation of legislative power, as it
is in the United States Constitution.”17
This Note will explore the Law Court’s conclusion that the Ex Post Facto
provisions of the Maine Constitution and the United States Constitution are
coextensive, and thus require the same analysis when determining whether a law
violates the respective clauses. Part II will discuss the Law Court’s analysis of the
retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 in Letalien, and explore the legal
context surrounding ex post facto jurisprudence in general. Part III will examine
the Law Court’s history of conducting state constitutional analyses independent of
federal courts’ analyses under the United States Constitution. Finally, in Part IV,
this Note will discuss whether Letalien required the Law Court to address the
question of co-extensiveness with regard to ex post facto challenges, and also
whether public policy in Maine demands an independent analysis of laws under the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Maine Constitution. This Note will argue that Maine’s
public policy objectives are better served by using a balancing approach to the
10. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11222(4) (2001-2002)).
11. Id. ¶ 9, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2003, ch. 371, § 7 (effective Sept. 13, 2003) (codified at 34A M.R.S.A. § 11221(9) (2004-2005))).
12. Id. ¶ 13, 985 A.2d at 11.
13. Id. ¶ 20, 985 A.2d at 13.
14. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 63, 985 A.2d at 26.
15. Id. ¶ 65, 985 A.2d at 26 (Silver, J., concurring).
16. Id. ¶¶ 69-71, 985 A.2d at 28.
17. Id. ¶ 71, 985 A.2d at 28.
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retroactive application of SORNA, where the court weighs the interests of the
individual affected by the law against the State’s interests in promoting public
safety.
II. THE STATE V. LETALIEN DECISION
A. The Facts of the Case
In 1996, Eric Letalien pleaded guilty to the gross sexual assault of a thirteenyear-old girl, an offense he committed when he was nineteen years old.18 He was
sentenced to four years’ incarceration, with all but twenty months suspended, and
four years’ probation.19 A clinical psychologist testified at trial that Letalien
presented the lowest possible risk of reoffending.20 In August of 1996, during his
sentencing, Letalien was subject to SORNA of 1995, which required him to register
his address with the SBI for a period of fifteen years from the time of his release
from incarceration.21 Under SORNA of 1995, Letalien could seek a waiver from
the registration requirements when five years had passed from the time he first
registered.22
In 1999, the Maine Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999.23 SORNA of 1999,
unlike the earlier versions of the law, recognized two categories of offenders: “sex
offenders,” who were required to register for ten years (ten-year registrants) and
“sexually violent offenders,” who were required to register for life (lifetime
registrants).24 A waiver of these registration requirements was only available for
either category of offender in the event of a pardon or if the offender’s conviction
was overturned.25 In 2001, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 so that it
applied to defendants sentenced for sex offenses on or after June 30, 1992, and

18. Id. ¶ 2, 985 A.2d at 7. The sexual encounter that resulted in his conviction took place with the
younger sister of Letalien’s best friend. Brief of Appellee at 3, State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985
A.2d 4. At trial, the district court found that the act would have been consensual but for the age of the
girl, who was two months shy of her fourteenth birthday at the time of the incident. Id. at 4. Letalien
testified that at the time of the encounter, he believed she was fourteen or fifteen. Id. The district court
received expert testimony from a forensic psychologist reporting that Letalien did not meet any of the
diagnostic criteria for that of a pedophile. Id. at 12.
19. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 2, 985 A.2d at 8.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 5, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(2)-(3) (1996-1997)). SORNA of 1995
defined “sex offender” as “an individual convicted of gross sexual assault if the victim had not in fact
attained 16 years of age at the time of the crime . . . .” § 11103(5). Thus, because Letalien’s victim was
thirteen-years-old at the time of the offense, Letalien was required to register under this statute.
22. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 5, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11121(6)(C) (1996-1997)).
SORNA of 1995 provided that “[r]egistration may be waived only if . . . [t]he Superior Court, upon the
petition of the sex offender, . . . determine[s] that the sex offender has shown a reasonable likelihood
that registration is no longer necessary and waiver of the registration requirement is appropriate.” §
11121(6)(C).
23. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 6, 985 A.2d at 9 (citing P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18,
1999) (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11201-11252 (1999-2000))).
24. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11225(1)-(2) (1999-2000)).
25. Id. (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11225(4) (1999-2000)).
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before September 18, 1999.26 As a result of this amendment, Letalien became
subject to the more stringent registration requirements of SORNA of 1999.27
Because Letalien had been convicted of gross sexual assault of a person who was
under the age of fourteen, he was a “sexually violent offender” under SORNA of
1999, and thus was required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.28 In
addition, Letalien was now required to report in person to his local law
enforcement agency for address and employment verification, fingerprinting, and
photographing, every ninety days, without the possibility of ever obtaining a
waiver from these requirements.29 In 2003, the Legislature further revised SORNA
of 1999 to require that the SBI maintain an Internet website posting information
about the registrants.30
Letalien first registered as a sex offender under SORNA of 1995 upon his
release from incarceration, and for the first time under SORNA of 1999 in 2003.31
In July 2007, Letalien was arrested for failure to comply with SORNA of 1999
after he failed to verify his registration information as required.32 Letalien pleaded
not guilty and claimed that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 violated
the prohibition of ex post facto laws under both the Maine and Federal
Constitutions.33 The District Court granted Letalien’s motion to dismiss the
complaint, concluding that SORNA of 1999, as applied to Letalien, violated the Ex
Post Facto Clauses under both constitutions.34 In December 2009, the Law Court
affirmed the decision of the District Court.35
B. Federal Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence and the Law Court’s Analysis
Article I of the United States Constitution, which sets forth the powers and
limitations of the legislative branch, provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . .
ex post facto Law . . . .”36 Similarly, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Maine
26. Id. ¶ 7, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2001, ch. 439, § 000-7 (effective Sept. 21, 2001) (codified at
34-A M.R.S.A § 11202 (2001-2002))).
27. Id.
28. Id. ¶ 8, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11202, 11203(7)(A), 11203(8)(A), 11225(2)
(2001-2002)).
29. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 8, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing 34-A M.R.S.A § 11222(4) (2001-2002)).
30. Id. ¶ 9, 985 A.2d at 10 (citing P.L. 2003, ch. 371, § 7 (effective Sept. 13, 2003) (codified at 34A M.R.S.A § 11221(9) (2004-2005))). See also Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Maine Sex Offender Registry
Online Search Service, http://sor.informe.org/sor (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
31. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 13, 985 A.2d at 11.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. ¶ 14, 985 A.2d at 11.
35. Id. ¶ 1, 985 A. 2d at 7. Though the District Court evaluated the law as applied to Letalien, the
Law Court held that a facial analysis was consistent with precedent and analyzed it as such. Id. ¶ 34,
985 A.2d at 17.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit provided an enlightening explanation for the importance of the Ex Post Facto
Clause:
It both enforces the principle that legislation is prospective, whereas punishment—the job
assigned . . . to the judicial branch—is retrospective, and gives people a minimal sense of
control over their lives by guaranteeing that as long as they avoid an act in the future they
can avoid punishment for something they did in the past, which cannot be altered.
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Constitution, which is included in the Declaration of Rights article, states that
“[t]he Legislature shall pass no . . . ex post facto law . . . .”37 Although the phrase
“ex post facto,” taken literally, would include any law passed after the performance
of an action, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Collins v. Youngblood that the
prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal statutes that
“disadvantage” the offender affected by them.38 Included within the scope of the
clause is “any statute . . . which makes more burdensome the punishment for a
crime, after its commission . . . .”39 The Law Court adopted a standard of analysis
similar to the United States Supreme Court’s standard in Collins v. Youngblood
when it held that a state law did not violate Maine’s Ex Post Facto Clause because
it did not make more burdensome the punishment of a crime after its commission.40
In determining whether a statute renders the punishment for a crime more
burdensome, the Supreme Court has implemented what is known as the “intenteffects” test.41 Under the first prong of this two-pronged analysis, the Court
determines whether the legislature, in passing a statute, intended it to impose
punishment, or whether the statute was intended to be of a civil, regulatory
nature.42 If the Court finds the legislature intended the statute as punishment, the
law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the analysis ends there.43 If the statute
is found to have been intended as regulatory, the inquiry continues to the “effects”
prong, where the Court determines whether the statute, as shown by the “clearest
proof,” is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention
to deem it ‘civil.’”44 The Supreme Court has utilized seven factors, known as the
“Mendoza-Martinez factors,” when examining the punitive effects of a civil
statute.45 These factors are:
[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on
a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the

United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008).
37. Me. Const. art. I, § 11.
38. 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).
39. Id. at 42 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)).
40. State v. Joubert, 603 A.2d 861, 869 (Me. 1992) (citing Collins, 497 U.S. at 41).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99
(1997) (utilizing the “intent-effects” test to determine the punitive nature of a statute in the context of
the Double Jeopardy Clause); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (utilizing
the “intent-effects” test to determine the punitive nature of a statute in the context of the Due Process
Clause).
42. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
45. Id. at 97. In Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court utilized these factors in determining
whether the Nationality Act of 1940, which divested a person of his United States citizenship if he left
the United States for the purposes of evading the draft, was so punitive in effect as to violate the
person’s due process rights. 372 U.S. at 163-70.
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46

The Court has stated that the factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but are
useful guideposts.”47
Although ex post facto challenges to sex offender registry and notification
laws have been brought in many state and federal courts,48 the question did not
reach the United States Supreme Court until 2003, in Smith v. Doe.49 The Smith
Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, enacted in 1994, did not
violate the United States Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to Doe,
who had been convicted of the sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced in 1990.50 In
doing so, the Court applied the “intent-effects” test and utilized the MendozaMartinez factors, placing the greatest emphasis on whether the statute had a
rational connection to a non-punitive purpose.51
Letalien argued that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 violated the
prohibition of ex post facto laws because it rendered the punishment for his crime
more burdensome.52 He urged the Law Court to construe the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the Maine Constitution as affording greater protection than its federal
counterpart, and to apply an independent and more stringent method of analysis
than the United States Supreme Court has applied in ex post facto cases.53 Prior to
Letalien, the Law Court had never explicitly held that Maine’s constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto laws was coextensive with the federal prohibition.
However, the Law Court had consistently applied the same analysis set forth by the
Supreme Court when considering ex post facto challenges.54 Letalien’s contention
was that the placement of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the Declaration of Rights
article in the Maine Constitution should be regarded as setting forth an affirmative
right affording greater protection than its federal counterpart, which is “set forth as
a limitation on the power of the legislative branch in the article establishing

46. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 31, 985 A.2d at 16-17 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 16869).
47. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
48. In 1994, New Jersey became the first state to enact a sex offender registration and community
notification statute, commonly known as “Megan’s Law.” See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374
(Ind. 2009). Megan’s Law was passed after seven-year-old Megan Kanka was abducted, molested, and
murdered by a convicted sex offender who had moved in across the street from Megan’s family without
their knowledge. Id. After the constitutionality of Megan’s Law was upheld by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 404-05 (N.J. 1995), ex post facto challenges sprang up in
courts all over the country as states enacted similar sex offender registration and notification laws. See
Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 374.
49. 538 U.S. 84.
50. Id. at 105-06.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 26, 985 A.2d at 14.
53. Id. ¶ 20, 985 A.2d at 13.
54. See, e.g., State v. Joubert, 603 A.2d 861, 868-69 (Me. 1992); State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶¶
6-10, 784 A.2d 4, 8-10; Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 2007 ME 139, ¶¶ 27-28, 932 A.2d 552, 560-61. In Doe
v. District Attorney, the Law Court stated: “We do not have cause to reconsider our equating the Ex Post
Facto Clause in the Maine Constitution with the same clause in the United States Constitution.” 2007
ME 139, ¶ 26 n.6, 932 A.2d at 560 (citation to footnote only). Presumably, this is because the plaintiff
in Doe did not argue that the respective clauses should not be equated.
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legislative authority.”55 The Law Court declined to accept this argument, noting
that the placement of the Ex Post Facto Clauses in the state and federal
constitutions is a function of the history and context in which each constitution was
developed, and that the framers of both constitutions regarded the ban on ex post
facto laws as fundamental to the protection of individual liberty.56 After holding
that the state and federal clauses are coextensive, the Law Court applied the
“intent-effects” test set forth by the Supreme Court, utilizing the seven MendozaMartinez factors to conclude that the effect of the law was so punitive as to
overcome the Legislature’s regulatory intent.57
In applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to the retroactive application of
SORNA of 1999, the Law Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
recognized that a statute’s “rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose” was the
most significant factor in determining the punitive effect of a regulatory statute.58
In its own evaluation, however, the Law Court emphasized two other MendozaMartinez factors as being the most probative: whether the regulation imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint, and whether sanctions imposed by the statute
have historically been regarded as punishment.59
To the Law Court, it was beyond question that the newly imposed lifetime inperson registration requirements on Letalien constituted an affirmative disability or
restraint: “[Q]uarterly, in-person verification . . . , including fingerprinting and the
submission of a photograph, for the remainder of one’s life, is undoubtedly a form
of significant supervision by the state.”60 The Law Court distinguished SORNA of
1999 from the Alaska sex offender registry statute upheld by the Supreme Court in
Smith, which did not require updates to be made in person.61
The Law Court’s analysis as to whether the registration requirements have
historically been regarded as punishment differed somewhat from the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Smith.62 In Smith, the Supreme Court considered Alaska’s
statute in light of the historical punishments of public shaming and banishment
during colonial times.63 In contrast, the Law Court’s analysis focused on the
“unique history of the development of sex offender registration laws in Maine
. . . .”64 The Law Court concluded that the registration requirements were an
integral part of the sentencing process of the earlier versions of SORNA, and thus,
in the context of Maine’s history of sex offender registration laws, the registration
55. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 20, 985 A.2d at 13.
56. Id. ¶ 24, 985 A.2d at 14.
57. Id. ¶ 62, 985 A.2d at 26.
58. Id. ¶ 32, 985 A.2d at 17 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003)).
59. Id. ¶ 57, 985 A.2d at 24.
60. Id. ¶ 37, 985 A.2d at 18.
61. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 37, 985 A.2d at 18.
62. Id. ¶ 38, 985 A.2d at 19.
63. Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-98). In Smith, the Supreme Court distinguished the registration
law by noting that any similarity to the early punishments was misleading; shaming punishments had the
sole purpose of stigmatizing an individual, while the registration statute’s purpose was to disseminate
truthful information in the name of public safety. 538 U.S. at 98. The Court stated: “Our system does
not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as
punishment.” Id.
64. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 39, 985 A.2d at 19.

2010] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY AND THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE

375

requirements had historically been regarded as punishment.65 Therefore, the
retroactive application of more stringent registration requirements of SORNA of
1999 made this “punishment” more burdensome.66
Placing great emphasis on these two factors, the Law Court concluded that
Letalien had shown by the “clearest proof” that the punitive effects of the
retroactive application of SORNA of 1999, as applied to those sentenced under
earlier versions of the law and without, at minimum, affording those offenders any
opportunity to ever be relieved of the duty, were enough to overcome the
Legislature’s regulatory intent.67
C. Justice Silver’s Concurrence
Justice Silver issued a concurring opinion in which he asserted that the Maine
Constitution should be regarded as providing a higher level of protection against ex
post facto laws than the Federal Constitution.68 The majority’s decision, according
to Justice Silver, should have been based on an independent analysis under the
Maine Constitution.69 In so concluding, Justice Silver relied on the placement of
the clause in Maine’s Declaration of Rights article.70 He argued that it is
significant that the framers of the Maine Constitution chose to place the prohibition
in that article, where personal rights are enumerated, rather than in Article IV,
which sets out the powers and limitations of Maine’s Legislature.71
The analysis Justice Silver proposed would have paralleled the analysis
utilized by the Supreme Court of Alaska in Doe v. Alaska.72 In that case, the
Alaska Supreme Court struck down the very same statute upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, concluding that the Alaska Constitution
afforded a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws than the United
States Constitution.73 While the Doe court adopted the same “intent-effects” test
utilized by the United States Supreme Court, it lowered the standard of proof
required for the “effects” prong of the inquiry.74 Instead of requiring the “clearest
proof” of punitive effects to overcome a legislature’s civil intent, it adopted a
“presumption of constitutionality” approach.75 According to Justice Silver,
65. Id. ¶ 43, 985 A.2d at 20-21.
66. Id.
67. Id. ¶ 62, 985 A.2d at 26.
68. Id. ¶ 65, 985 A.2d at 26 (Silver, J., concurring).
69. Id. ¶ 65, 985 A.2d at 26-27.
70. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 71, 985 A.2d at 28.
71. Id. ¶ 69, 985 A.2d at 28.
72. Id. ¶ 72, 985 A.2d at 28 (citing Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d 999, 1008 n.62 (Alaska 2008)).
73. Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d at 1005.
74. Id. at 1008 n.62 (citation to footnote only).
75. Id. Applying the lower standard of proof, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that there was
sufficient evidence to conclude that the statute imposed an affirmative disability or restraint: Doe had
shown instances of registrants losing and having difficulty finding housing and employment, suffering
community hostility, damage to business, and damage to marital relationships due to fear of effects of
public dissemination. Id. at 1011-12. This finding is in stark contrast with the United States Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Smith that it was mere conjecture that employers would not want to risk loss of
business by hiring registered sex offenders. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100-01. The Supreme Court of Alaska
also noted that the dissemination requirements of the statute were comparable to the historical
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adherence to the heightened “clearest proof” standard could “threaten rights
protected by [the Maine] Constitution and might be inconsistent with the
responsibilities of this court.”76
Justice Silver also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the
registration requirements of SORNA of 1999 only incidentally promoted the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence.77 He reasoned that
even though the statute was not intended as retribution, there can be no doubt that it
promotes community condemnation, and in some instances, vigilantism.78 To
support of this position, he referred to the 2006 murders of two men whose
addresses had been obtained by their killer from Maine’s Sex Offender Registry.79
III. INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN MAINE
A. Some Views on the Validity of State Courts Conducting Independent
Constitutional Analyses
It has long been an accepted tenet of federalism that states are free to adopt
higher standards of protection than those afforded by the United States
Constitution.80 Former United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan
argued that the states have not only the ability, but the responsibility to their
citizens to consider whether their own state constitutions afford greater protection
than the constitutional floor provided by the United States Constitution:
[T]he point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest when they have
afforded their citizens the full protections of the [F]ederal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal
law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for without it, the
81
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.

There has been much debate concerning when and under what circumstances
state courts should conduct independent state constitutional analyses that differ or
afford greater protection than the Federal Constitution. Some scholars and judges
punishment of shaming, and resembled the conditions of parole. Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d at 1012. The
Supreme Court of Indiana has similarly concluded that its state constitution affords greater protection
against ex post facto laws than does the United States Constitution, and has also imposed this less
stringent “presumption of constitutionality” standard. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 378 n.7 (citation to
footnote only).
76. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 72, 985 A.2d at 28 (Silver, J., concurring) (quoting Doe v. Alaska, 189
P.3d at 1008 n.62 (citation to footnote only)).
77. Id. ¶ 75, 985 A.2d at 29.
78. Id.
79. Id. In 2006, a Canadian man compiled the names, addresses, and photographs of twenty-nine
sex offenders from Maine’s Online Sex Offender Registry before killing two registered sex offenders at
their homes and then committing suicide. See David Hench, Killer Drove to Maine with a Long List of
Sex Offenders, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 26, 2006, at A1.
80. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (“Of course, the States are free, pursuant to
their own law, to adopt a higher standard.”).
81. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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have expressed dissatisfaction with what they consider poorly articulated rationales
from state judges who have departed from federal constitutional analyses.82 Some
factors that have been considered by states in determining whether their own
constitutions afford greater protection than the Federal Constitution are: differences
between the text of the state and federal constitutional provisions; the history of the
provision; structural differences between the state and federal constitutions; case
law from other states; and state public policy concerns.83
B. Independent State Constitutional Analysis in Maine
The Law Court has held that the Maine Constitution affords greater protection
than its federal counterpart in a number of areas of criminal law. For example, in
State v. Collins, the Law Court held that the Maine Constitution provides a higher
level of protection for the voluntariness of confessions.84 At the time, the United
States Supreme Court had recently decided the case of Lego v. Twomey, where it
established that the prosecution should bear the burden of establishing by a
“preponderance of the evidence” the “voluntariness” of a confession.85 In doing so,
the Supreme Court stressed that such a standard was adequate for promoting the
government’s goal of deterring lawless conduct by police officers.86 The Law
Court, in contrast, held that a heightened standard of scrutiny should be applied in
Maine, requiring the voluntariness of confessions to be established by the
prosecution by “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”87 In doing so, the Law Court
82. See Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams Made Me Do It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial
Chauvinism, and Article 14 of Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights, 77 MISS. L.J. 315, 342-43 (2007)
(arguing that a state court has an obligation to articulate its rationale very clearly when
constitutionalizing a principle and persuading reasonable people that the court’s departure from federal
jurisprudence stems from reasoning other than personal predilection); Francis Barry McCarthy,
Counterfeit Interpretations of State Constitutions in Criminal Procedure, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79, 80
(2007) (arguing that state courts’ independent analyses of state constitutions are “counterfeit” in that
they are not really independent at all, but only pale imitations of the Supreme Court’s analyses); Jack L.
Landau, A Judge’s Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in State Constitutional Interpretation,
38 VAL. U.L. REV. 451, 451-52 (2004) (arguing that reliance on history and original intent in state
constitutional interpretation unavoidably involves value judgments and personal predilection of judges);
Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitutional Decision-Making, 77
MISS. L.J. 265, 267-68 (2007) (arguing that reactive state constitutional interpretations that lack
completely theorized justifications are problematic because they fail to contribute meaningfully to the
larger legal discourse and fail to supply the legal community with sufficient guidance regarding
constitutional interpretation). But see Leigh A. Morrissey, State Courts Reject Leon on State
Constitutional Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND. L. REV. 917, 940 (1994) (“[N]o
reason exists to consider reactive decisions less principled or legitimate than those decisions that base
their rejections of a Supreme Court decision on a state-specific factor.”).
83. Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 764 (Wash. 2007).
84. 297 A.2d 620, 627 (Me. 1972).
85. Id. at 625 (citing Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489). The Twomey Court noted that it had long held that
evidence, including involuntary confessions, obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures” or the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
self-incrimination was to be excluded from trial. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 488-89. The Maine Constitution
contains similar provisions protecting against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and selfincrimination. Me. Const. art. I, §§ 5, 6.
86. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489.
87. Collins, 297 A.2d at 627.
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focused on Maine’s public policy goals and the “appropriate resolution of the
values [we] find at stake.”88 The Law Court focused on the importance of
safeguarding the right of the individual defendant in not being compelled into selfincrimination, apart from the objective of deterring lawless conduct of police
officers.89 The Law Court stressed the importance of the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination in the furtherance of public policy in Maine.90
The reliance on the importance of Maine’s public policy concerns was stressed
again by the Law Court in State v. Rees, which reaffirmed Collins’ heightened
standard on the voluntariness of confessions.91 In Rees, former Chief Justice
Wathen’s majority opinion reiterated Maine’s public policy objective in
safeguarding the rights of individual defendants, and concluded that the rationale in
Collins continued to support the State’s public policy.92 In her dissent, thenAssociate Justice Saufley focused on the historical application of the federal and
state provisions and noted that the Law Court, until recently, had consistently
followed the analysis of the United States Supreme Court with regard to protection
against self-incrimination.93 Justice Saufley stated: “[W]e have consistently
interpreted fundamentally similar provisions of our constitution coextensively with
their federal counterparts. When we have chosen to depart from this principle, we
have traditionally exercised great restraint in doing so.”94
IV. SHOULD THE LAW COURT HAVE CONDUCTED AN INDEPENDENT STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SORNA OF
1999?
A. The Law Court Should Have Reserved the Question of Co-extensiveness for a
Case When an Independent Analysis Would Have Been Necessary
In Letalien, there was no cause for the Law Court to have explicitly foreclosed
the possibility of an independent analysis under the state constitution because the
court had already decided that the retroactive application of the law had fallen
below the constitutional floor established by the federal ex post facto prohibition.
In Doe v. Alaska, the Supreme Court of Alaska was faced with a statute that had
already been held as passing federal constitutional muster by the United States
Supreme Court using the “clearest proof” standard.95 In deciding that the Alaska
Constitution afforded greater protection against ex post facto laws, the court noted
that it was now faced with a federal decision that was inconsistent with the Alaska
Constitution.96 In Letalien, on the other hand, the Law Court was not faced with a
similar inconsistency. It applied the “intent-effects” test according to federal
precedent and determined that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 626 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
2000 ME 55, ¶ 8, 748 A.2d 976, 979.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28, 748 A.2d at 984 (Saufley, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 31, 748 A.2d at 985 (internal quotations omitted).
189 P.3d 999, 1002 (Alaska 2008).
Id. at 1005.
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violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Law Court went
further and explicitly held that the clauses are coextensive. As a result, the court
foreclosed the possibility that, if presented with a case in the future where ex post
facto analysis under the federal standard is inconsistent with the Maine
Constitution, it may adopt an independent test, thus affording greater protection
against ex post facto laws.
B. Can a More Useful Analysis Be Suggested?
In relying solely on a comparison of the framers’ intent in drafting the
respective constitutions, the Law Court failed to consider whether Maine’s public
policy goals would have been better served by conducting an independent ex post
facto analysis.97 The Law Court noted that the United States Supreme Court
considered the Mendoza-Martinez factors to be but a “useful framework” for ex
post facto analysis, yet mechanically considered each of the seven factors, deciding
whether each one resulted in a determination of “punitive” or “nonpunitive.”98
What the Law Court did not consider in its analysis was just how useful each
of these seven factors is to laws challenged under the Ex Post Facto Clause, and
whether a more useful test conducted independent of the federal courts’ analyses
would have been more appropriate. The Mendoza-Martinez case, in which the
factors were originally enumerated, was a due process case. All seven factors do
not necessarily translate into the context of an ex post facto analysis. For example,
the factor concerning whether the obligation to register under SORNA is triggered
only upon a finding of scienter seems wholly misplaced in the context of ex post
facto analysis, and the Law Court disposed of this factor in one short sentence.99
Another factor addresses whether the regulation is excessive in relation to a
nonpunitive purpose. Given the fact that another factor—the “rational connection
to a nonpunitive purpose” factor—requires a court to determine whether the statute
is narrowly drawn, a separate inquiry into whether the regulation is excessive
seems redundant.
A balancing analysis would have been a more useful approach for the Law
Court to have applied in this case. Such an analysis would require the court to
weigh the state interests in protecting children against the burden placed upon the
individual who is to be subjected to the more stringent registration requirements.
Certain Mendoza-Martinez factors have relevance in a balancing analysis, while
allowing the Law Court to tailor the approach so that it aligns more closely with ex
post facto analysis in general and Maine’s public policy interests in particular, and
does not “threaten rights protected by [the Maine] Constitution .”100
When considering the burdens placed upon an individual resulting from the
retroactive application of SORNA of 1999, two main concerns should be
considered. The first is whether the regulation imposes an affirmative disability or
97. Other courts have rejected the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in ex post facto analysis.
See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 399-400 (N.J. 1995); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d
1235, 1262 (3d Cir. 1996).
98. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 35-55, 985 A.2d at 18-24.
99. Id. ¶ 44, 985 A.2d at 21.
100. Id. ¶ 72, 985 A.2d at 28 (Silver, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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restraint. In Letalien, the Law Court placed great emphasis on this factor. The
Law Court concluded that lifetime quarterly in-person registration requirements
without the possibility of a waiver constituted a significant restraint on the
individual. The retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to Letalien imposed a
substantial new burden on him by requiring him to physically report to his local
law enforcement agency.
Another concern is the stigma that is created upon registering as a sex
offender. The Law Court did not take this factor into account in its analysis, nor
did it consider how the stigma itself can create an affirmative disability or restraint.
For example, Letalien testified in the trial court that he had lost at least one job due
to his status as a registered sex offender.101 One job loss resulted from pressure on
his employer from customers “raising Cain that [he was] employing a sex offender”
and from Letalien’s fears for his own safety after a co-worker who was also a
registered sex offender was beaten to the point of requiring hospitalization.102 The
stigma associated with being a registered sex offender can impact other aspects of
life as well, such as housing. For instance, after discovering that seventeen
registered sex offenders were residing in one property in Portland, Maine,
Portland’s City Manager announced that the City Council was working on an
ordinance to ban sex offenders from living within 750 feet of a public or private
school.103 In another instance, a registered sex offender committed suicide when
faced with the prospect of police notifying the community of his presence in the
neighborhood.104 These concerns highlight the fact that registering as a sex
offender can affect registrants’ lives in real and substantial ways by affecting their
ability to find employment and housing. Retroactively imposing tougher
registration requirements while at the same time eliminating the ability to ever be
granted relief from them clearly imposes a significant burden on an individual.
On the other side of the coin, the very legitimate state interest in protecting the
public, particularly children, from convicted sex offenders must be considered.
Community notification statutes warn parents when a potentially dangerous
predator has moved into the neighborhood. Thus, sex offender registry statutes
have a nonpunitive purpose even though they may have a palpable detrimental
effect on the registrant.
However, one must ask how effective community notification laws are in
promoting a state’s nonpunitive goal of protecting children. Erik Lotke, in his
article critiquing the effectiveness of community notification statutes, argued that
sex offender registry laws were hastily passed by legislatures, are based on false
assumptions, and are apt to create unintended problems that weaken any perceived
101. Brief of Appellee at 21-22, State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4.
102. Id. at 22.
103. Bill Nemitz, Sex Offenders “Have to Go Somewhere,” PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 20,
2009, at C1. Denise Lord, Associate Commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections, noted that
one concern with placing residency restrictions on registered sex offenders is that the more limitations
are imposed, the more likely those offenders are to “drop off the registry” altogether. Id.
104. Jason Wolfe, Balance Hard to Find in Notification Statutes, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb.
15, 1998, at A1. At the time, statutes left community notification to the discretion of local authorities.
Id. When the town began circulating fliers and knocking on doors to inform the neighborhood that
registered sex offender Thomas Varnum, who had been convicted of child molestation in 1996, was
living in the neighborhood, Varnum put a shotgun to his head and killed himself. Id.
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benefits.105 Though recidivism statistics are difficult to state with precision, many
authorities consider sex offenders to be among the highest of any group likely to
reoffend.106 However, other studies have shown the re-offense rates of sex
offenders to be within the range of ten to eighteen percent—a rate much lower than
for other types of crime.107 Furthermore, notification laws are based partially on
the assumption that it is impossible to rehabilitate sex offenders. Yet, studies on
the effectiveness of treatment are at worst inconclusive, and at best show that
treatment can make a substantial difference on recidivism rates of offenders.108
Lotke also explained that notification statutes can have many unforeseen
consequences, such as the impact on the victim, the likelihood that the offender
will relocate to a community with less organized notification procedures, the
possibility of vigilantism against the registered offender, and the possibility of
lulling the public into a false sense of security, or, paradoxically, spreading an
artificial sense of terror.109
Moreover, the term “sex offense” under SORNA applies to a wide variety of
behavior, and the almost total elimination of the waiver provision fails to take into
account the fact that some offenders pose a higher risk of reoffending than others.
For example, during Letalien’s trial, a psychologist testified that he did not meet
any of the criteria of a pedophile, and that he presented the lowest possible risk of
reoffending.110 On this assessment, a court could likely have waived his
registration requirements after five years under SORNA of 1995. Once SORNA of
1999 was applied to Letalien, however, this possibility was eliminated. SORNA of
1999 is overbroad in this sense. It neglects to take into account any assessment of
risk among offenders, and as a result pulls low-risk perpetrators, like Letalien,
within its scope along with high-risk, repeat offenders, without noting any
distinction between them. The failure of the Legislature to narrowly tailor the
statute suggests that its effect is directed more towards punishment than the
protection of children.
Applying a balancing test to the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to
those sentenced according to earlier versions of the law, it becomes clear that the
burden to the individual outweighs the goals of the state, at least as SORNA of
1999 exists in its current form. The substantial burdens on liberty and privacy

105. Eric Lotke, Politics and Irrelevance: Community Notification Statutes, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 64,
64-66 (1998).
106. Catherine Ivey, What’s Fair? Sex Offender Notification a Balancing Act in Maine Communities,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 25, 1998, at A1.
107. Lotke, supra note 105, at 64.
108. Id. at 65. During the time the Maine Legislature was considering the passage of SORNA and its
subsequent amendments, many groups urged that resources be used for the treatment of sex offenders
rather than utilized for expanded registration requirements. See, e.g., Letter from Sally Sutton, Exec.
Director, Maine Civil Liberties Union, to Maine State Legislature (Mar. 4, 1992) (on file with the Maine
State Law and Legislative Reference Library); Letter from Cushman D. Anthony, Clerk, Friends Comm.
on Maine Pub. Policy to Senator John W. Benoit & Representative Herbert E. Clark, Co-Chairs, Joint
Standing Comm. on Criminal Justice (on file with the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference
Library); Memorandum from Criminal Law Advisory Comm’n to Criminal Justice Comm. (Apr. 8,
1999) (on file with the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference Library).
109. Lotke, supra note 105, at 66-67.
110. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 2, 985 A.2d at 8.
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placed on a registrant, taken with the broadness of SORNA of 1999 in
encompassing such a wide variety of offenses without taking into account the
individual’s risk of reoffending, suggests that the punitive effects are substantial
enough to overcome the civil, regulatory intent of the Legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no easy answer to the question of how best to protect the public from
convicted sex offenders living in their communities. Registration and notification
statutes like SORNA are one method states can utilize to further the goal of
promoting public safety by making communities aware of potentially violent
predators. However, notification statutes can also place substantial burdens on the
individual who must comply with them. SORNA raises issues of liberty, privacy,
and personal safety, and legislatures must narrowly tailor such statutes to ensure
that the burdens are in proportion to the nonpunitive goal of protecting the public.
For Letalien, there is no question that there is a significant difference between
having to register as a sex offender for the next five to fifteen years, as he was
required to do under SORNA of 1995, and having to register for the rest of his life
with no possibility of relief from these duties, as was required under SORNA of
1999. The question became whether the retroactive application of the stricter
version of the law was so punitive in effect as to constitute a violation of the ex
post facto prohibition.
While the Law Court reached the correct conclusion—that the law was so
punitive in effect as to violate the state and Federal Constitutions—its analysis
foreclosed on the opportunity of conducting an ex post facto analysis independent
of the United States Supreme Court’s. The question of whether the Maine
Constitution affords a higher level of protection against ex post facto laws did not
need to be reached in Letalien because the Law Court had already found that
SORNA of 1999’s retroactive application did not meet the minimum standard set
forth by the United States Constitution.
Furthermore, the Law Court did not address the issue of whether a more
appropriate ex post facto analysis could better serve Maine’s public policy
interests. Instead of relying on the Mendoza-Martinez factors, many of which have
little or no relevance to challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Law Court
could have used a balancing approach to evaluate the punitive effects of the statute.
Utilizing a balancing approach would have allowed the Law Court to recognize the
importance of both individual and state interests as reflected in Maine’s
Constitution. In order to achieve the “full realization of our liberties,” as Justice
Brennan put it,111 the Law Court must ensure that state constitutional analysis in
Maine carries the full protective force of law for its citizens.

111. Brennan, supra note 81, at 491.

